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FROM BLOCKBUSTER TO BIG BROTHER: HOW AN INCREASE 
IN MOBILE PHONE APPS HAS LED TO A DECREASE IN 
PRIVACY UNDER THE VIDEO PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT
Carlee Rizzolo*
Abstract
Congress enacted the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA or the Act)
in 1988 to protect consumers by prohibiting video tape service providers 
from knowingly disclosing their personally identifiable information to 
any person, without first obtaining consent. The VPPA defines 
“consumer” as any renter, purchaser, or subscriber. However, the Act 
does not define the term “subscriber.” Over the past thirty years, there 
has been a rapid increase in the use of downloadable apps that allow 
individuals to watch videos and other online content for free on their 
mobile phones. Does the sole act of downloading a free app onto a mobile 
phone make an individual a protected “subscriber?” This question has 
challenged the scope of protection afforded by the VPPA to consumers 
and has created a circuit split between the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit.
Both circuits have struggled to define “subscriber” and have struggled 
in determining when an individual’s conduct rises to the level of 
becoming a protected “consumer.” This Note argues for the resolution of 
the circuit split through a two-pronged approach. The first prong requires 
amending the VPPA to include a broad and unambiguous definition of 
“subscriber,” which will adequately protect the privacy rights of 
individuals that download and use free apps. The second prong requires 
implementing a balancing test consisting of several different factors that
the courts must weigh and consider. The test will allow courts to broaden 
the scope of the VPPA to protect the rights of individuals who rise to the 
level of protected “consumers,” despite their actions not falling squarely 
into one of the statutory requirements. 
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INTRODUCTION
An individual has a privacy interest in preventing their personal 
information from becoming public knowledge.1 Recognizing this right to 
privacy, Congress has continuously enacted statutes that “extend privacy 
protection to records that contain information about individuals.”2 In 
                                                                                                                     
1. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 769 
(1989). 
2. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 2–3 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342-1, 4342-1
to 4342-3 (listing several federal statutes that were enacted to increase privacy rights, including: 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 
the Privacy Act, the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, the 
Privacy Protection Act of 1980, the Electronic Funds Transfer Act of 1980, the Fair Debt 
Collection Act, the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, and the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act). 
2
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1988, Congress passed the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA or the 
Act),3 “to preserve personal privacy with respect to the rental, purchase,
or delivery of video tapes or similar audio visual materials.”4 The VPPA 
protects consumers by creating a civil remedy against video tape service 
providers who knowingly disclose their personally identifiable 
information to any person without first obtaining consent.5
The VPPA has extended privacy rights of individuals; however, its 
recent application to cases involving mobile phones has created a split 
among the circuit courts.6 The primary issue between the circuits 
concerns the statutory interpretation of an ambiguous and undefined term 
stated within the VPPA7: “subscriber.”8 Under 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1), 
the only individuals who will receive protection under the VPPA are 
“consumer[s].”9 The statute defines a “consumer” as “any renter, 
purchaser, or subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service 
provider.”10 However, an ambiguity lies within the definition of 
“consumer” in that it poses the question of what exactly constitutes a
“subscriber.”11 A second ambiguity within the statute, though not as 
                                                                                                                     
3. Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 
(2012)). 
4. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 1.  
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1). 
6. Compare Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1256–58 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(holding that an individual who downloads a mobile application onto his or her smartphone, to 
watch television episodes, is not a “subscriber” under the VPPA because the sole act of 
downloading an app to watch videos does not establish some type of ongoing relationship or 
commitment between the individual and the video provider), with Yershov v. Gannett Satellite 
Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 489 (1st Cir. 2016) (recognizing that an individual who 
downloads and installs a mobile application onto his or her phone, to access news and watch 
videos, establishes a relationship with the video tape service provider and may be a “subscriber” 
under the VPPA). 
7. Wendy Beylik, Comment, Enjoying Your “Free” App? The First Circuit’s Approach 
to an Outdated Law in Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc., 58 B.C. L. REV.
E. SUPP. 60, 62–63 (2017), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3562
&context=bclr&_ga=2.76414224.489497517.1552501361-220379575.1552501361 [https://perma.cc/
6CCE-EKYW] (“In applying the Act, courts have struggled to adapt its traditional verbiage to 
today’s electronic age, leading to uncertainty as to the extent of the VPPA’s online application.”).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (listing the definition of “consumer,” which includes the 
undefined term “subscriber”). 
9. Id. § 2710(b)(1) (“A video tape service provider who knowingly discloses, to any 
person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider shall be 
liable to the aggrieved person for the relief provided in subsection (d).”). 
10. Id. § 2710(a)(1). 
11. See id. (leaving the term “subscriber” undefined). 
3
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heavily discussed by the circuit split, is what type of information 
constitutes “personally identifiable information.”12
This Note argues that Congress should amend the VPPA to resolve 
the circuit split among the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and 
First Circuits.13 The proposed method of treatment includes two steps that 
require legislative action. The first step is amending the VPPA to include 
an unambiguous definition of “subscriber.” This will prevent courts from 
conducting their own statutory interpretation of the term. The second step 
establishes a balancing test that will aid courts in determining whether
the conduct of an individual rises to the level of becoming a protected 
“consumer.” With the increased use of online technology platforms that 
allow individuals to download videos directly onto their mobile phones, 
discerning when each individual becomes a “consumer” depends on the 
circumstances of each individual case. Therefore, the test provides an 
additional method for cases when an individual’s actions do not clearly 
fall into one of the statutory definitions. 
Part I of this Note discusses the legislative history of the VPPA, why 
it was enacted, and why it currently fails to adequately protect the privacy 
rights of individuals who download mobile phone apps. Part II analyzes 
the circuit split between the Eleventh Circuit and First Circuit, and why 
both circuits have differed in their statutory interpretations. Part III firmly 
addresses the issue by providing a new, clear definition of “subscriber” 
that will adequately protect the privacy rights of individuals who 
download mobile apps to watch videos. Lastly, Part IV introduces and 
describes a balancing test that courts may use to determine when an 
individual becomes a “consumer” under the VPPA. Since “subscriber” 
will be clearly defined under Part III, courts need only utilize the test 
stated in Part IV when an individual’s conduct does not clearly identify 
him as a consumer, purchaser, renter, or subscriber under the statute. 
Therefore, courts will have the discretion to apply the factors of the test 
based on the individual facts of a case. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE VPPA
A. The History Behind the VPPA: Why Change Now?
The VPPA was enacted in response to the Washington City Paper’s
publication of U.S. Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork’s video rental 
history, which the newspaper obtained without his knowledge or 
                                                                                                                     
12. See id. § 2710(a)(3) (“[T]he term ‘personally identifiable information’ includes 
information which identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or 
services from a video tape service provider . . . .”). 
13. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.
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consent.14 In 1987, the Washington City Paper published a profile of 
Bork after gathering information on the 146 movies that he and his family 
had rented from a video store.15 The public disclosure and invasion of 
privacy captured the attention of members of the United States Senate 
Judiciary Committee, who quickly condemned the publication and sought 
to prohibit such disclosures of personal information.16 In support of 
heightened privacy rights,17 committee members announced that the 
VPPA would enhance and strengthen an individual’s right to privacy by 
preventing the unauthorized disclosure of personal information to third 
parties.18 More specifically, with the increasing influx of new technology, 
the VPPA would help protect individuals from being subjected to the 
intrusive collection of personal information by video tape service 
providers.19
The public disclosure of an individual’s private facts have long been 
recognized as an invasion of privacy.20 In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and 
Louis D. Brandeis stated that certain business methods and inventions 
have highlighted the need for increased protection, which is to allow 
individuals “to be let alone.”21 Furthermore, William L. Prosser identified 
that the public disclosure of private facts, as well as the intrusion upon 
seclusion, are two of the four torts of privacy.22 Applying these policy 
arguments to the purpose of the VPPA, it is apparent that Congress 
                                                                                                                     
14. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 278 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting 
that the Washington City Paper published Robert Bork’s video rental history without first 
obtaining his consent); see Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618, 621 (7th Cir. 
2014). 
15. In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 278. See generally S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 5 (1988), as 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342-1, 4342-5 (discussing the legislative intent of the VPPA, 
including the incident with Robert Bork that prompted its enactment). 
16. See S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 5–6 (noting that several senators, including Senator Leahy 
and Senator Simpson, denounced the public disclosure of Robert Bork’s video rental history). 
17. Id. at 6 (“Privacy is something we all value. The right of privacy is not, however, a 
generalized undefined right: It is a specific right, one which individuals should understand. And 
it is the role of the legislature to define, expand, and give meaning to the concept of privacy. This 
bill will give specific meaning to the right of privacy, as it affects individuals in their daily lives.”
(quoting 134 CONG. REC. 10,261 (1988) (statement of Sen. Grassley))). 
18. See id. at 8.  
19. See In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 284 (“Congress’s purpose in passing the Video 
Privacy Protection Act was quite narrow: to prevent disclosures of information that would, with 
little or no extra effort, permit an ordinary recipient to identify a particular person’s video-
watching habits.”). 
20. In re Vizio, Inc., Consumer Privacy Litig., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1215–16 (C.D. Cal. 
2017) (discussing the common law history of the right to privacy). 
21. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
195 (1890) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS 
WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
22. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
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viewed the disclosure of an individual’s personal video and audio records 
as an invasion of privacy that needed to be addressed.23 Therefore, the 
VPPA in modern times should be interpreted to extend protection to 
individuals who download apps onto their mobile phones to view videos 
and other online forms of entertainment.24
The current issue with the VPPA stems from its outdated and vague 
language,25 which fails to consider the nature of relationships formed 
when individuals download a free app onto their mobile phones. In 1988, 
it was more common for individuals to physically “purchase” or “rent” a 
movie from a video provider, or to “subscribe” to a video provider.26
Given that an individual had to physically enter a store to purchase or rent 
a video, the formation of a relationship between the provider and 
individual was much easier to identify under the VPPA’s original 
construction. However, with the increasing use of online technology and 
mobile phones, individuals are now able to download easily free apps 
onto their mobile phones without having to ever physically enter a store. 
As a result, the language of the VPPA fails to identify the level of 
communication or engagement that is necessary, between a video 
provider and an individual, to consider him or her a “consumer” after he 
downloads an app. 
Since its enactment in 1988, Congress has amended the VPPA only  
once.27 In 2012, Congress revisited the statute and amended § 2710, “to 
clarify that a video tape service provider may obtain a consumer’s
informed, written consent on an ongoing basis and that consent may be 
obtained through the Internet.”28 By allowing providers to obtain consent 
through the Internet, Congress recognized the increasing use of 
technology among individuals; however, the amendment did not address 
the more pertinent issue: the unclear language of § 2710(a). Therefore, 
Congress’s failure to amend § 2710(a) has forced courts to perform their 
                                                                                                                     
23. See S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 1 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342-1, 4342-1
(“The Video Privacy Protection Act follows a long line of statutes passed by the Congress to 
extend privacy protection to records that contain information about individuals. In each instance, 
Congress has expanded and given meaning to the right of privacy.”). 
24. But see Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1258 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding 
that the plaintiff was not entitled to protection under the VPPA after a video tape provider 
knowingly disclosed his personal video viewing records and Android ID to a third party, without 
his consent or knowledge). 
25. See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text.
26. Beylik, supra note 7, at 65 (noting that the classic customer in 1998 “would physically 
purchase, rent, or subscribe” to video providers, as opposed to renting or downloading online 
videos).  
27. See Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258, 126 
Stat. 2414 (2013) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (2012)).
28. Id.
6
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own statutory interpretation of ambiguous terms such as “subscriber,” 
which has resulted in conflicting opinions.29
B. The Issue with Statutory Interpretation 
Under the VPPA, the definition of “subscriber” is open to 
interpretation.30 Courts have struggled to apply the statute to recent cases 
involving an expanding area of technology: mobile apps that allow users 
to watch videos on their mobile phones.31 The increased use of such apps 
and the development of this new type of relationship between video tape 
providers and individuals has challenged the scope of the VPPA.32 Courts 
have had to look beyond the statutory language of the VPPA to define 
“subscriber.”33 As a result, there is no clear definition that clarifies when 
an individual is protected under the VPPA by rising to the level of a 
“consumer.”34
The use of analogical reasoning by judges and courts to aid in the 
statutory interpretation of older legislation as applied to new technologies 
is problematic.35 Analogical reasoning impacts how a court will apply a 
                                                                                                                     
29. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
30. See Ellis v. Cartoon Network Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The VPPA 
does not define the term ‘subscriber,’ and we, as a circuit, have yet to address what the term 
means. The few district courts that have weighed in on the issue appear to be divided.”); see also
In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 278–79 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that the 
VPPA is not well drafted); Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 487 
(1st Cir. 2016) (“Because it contains no definition of the term ‘subscriber,’ nor any clear indication 
that Congress had a specific definition in mind, we assume that the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’
of the word applies.” (quoting Stornawaye Fin. Corp. v. Hill (In re Hill), 562 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 
2009))). 
31. See Beylik, supra note 7, at 65 (“Whether or not to extend VPPA protections to 
downloaders is a matter of judicial interpretation, hinging on nuanced understandings of modern 
technology and the relationships between providers and consumers.”).
32. See In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 288 (“Assessing congressional intent in these cases 
can be difficult; indeed, Congress may not have considered the temporal problem at all.”). 
33. See, e.g., Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1255–56 (noting that the court begins its statutory analysis 
of the VPPA by referencing several dictionaries); In re Vizio, Inc., Consumer Privacy Litig., 238 
F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1221 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (consulting multiple dictionaries to help define “video 
tape service provider” as stated in the VPPA (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4) (2012))).  
34. See Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1255 (“The VPPA does not define the term ‘subscriber,’ and we, 
as a circuit, have yet to address what the term means. The few district courts that have weighed 
in on the issue appear to be divided.”). 
35. See Luke M. Milligan, Analogy Breakers: A Reality Check on Emerging Technologies,
80 MISS. L.J. 1319, 1322 (2011) (“While analogical reasoning is particularly attractive to judges 
confronting technologies that were not likely foreseen at the time of the drafting of relevant 
legislation or precedent, the use of analogical reasoning to mediate old rules and emerging 
technologies has led to mixed results.” (footnote omitted)). 
7
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legal rule.36 The problem is that courts “have demonstrated a bad track 
record in adopting the appropriate analogies or metaphors for these new 
technologies.”37 When doing so, judges may not fully understand the 
modern “intricacies of new technologies.”38 This directly relates to how 
courts have struggled to apply the VPPA to a newly formed area of 
technology that easily allows individuals to watch videos from various 
online platforms.39 The courts’ regulation of new technology should not 
be left open to any type of statutory interpretation that resorts to 
analogical reasoning, especially when the legal issue involves the right to 
privacy.40 Therefore, Congress must amend the language of the VPPA to 
protect individuals who are able to watch free videos by downloading an 
app onto their mobile phone.
II. A SPLIT AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS
A. United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
1. Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc.
In 2015, the Eleventh Circuit addressed an issue of first impression in 
Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc.41 when it defined the term “subscriber” 
located in § 2710(a)(1).42 In that case, Mark Ellis brought suit against 
Cartoon Network (CN) after downloading and watching videos on CN’s 
free mobile app in 2013.43 Without Ellis’s consent, CN knowingly 
disclosed his Android ID and viewing records to Bango, a third-party data 
analytics company.44 Ellis alleged that he became a “subscriber” of CN 
after downloading the app onto his Android smartphone, thereby making 
him a protected “consumer” under the VPPA.45
The free app downloaded by Ellis allows users to watch TV show 
episodes on CN.46 Users also have the option to view additional content 
                                                                                                                     
36. Jonathan H. Blavin & I. Glenn Cohen, Note, Gore, Gibson, and Goldsmith: The 
Evolution of Internet Metaphors in Law and Commentary, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 265, 267 
(2002). 
37. Id.
38. Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 3, para. 8 (2007). 
39. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
40. See Blavin & Cohen, supra note 36, at 268 (“[J]udicial rejection of analogizing 
altogether may prove to be equally detrimental, as sui generis regimes governing new 
technologies have historically failed to preserve existing fundamental rights and liberties.”). 
41. 803 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2015).
42. Id. at 1255–56.
43. Id. at 1254. 
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1253. 
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by logging in with their television provider information.47 If users do not 
wish to provide their television provider information, they do not have to 
provide any other personal information to CN to view the free content.48
Furthermore, the app does “not ask users for their consent to share or 
otherwise disclose personally identifiable information to third parties.”49
After downloading the app, CN tracks users through their Android ID50
and keeps a record of every video users view.51 CN then sends the 
information to Bango.52 Bango uses the information to track individuals’
behavior and to analyze their engagement between mobile apps, as well 
as other websites.53
The district court ultimately dismissed Ellis’s amended complaint, but 
made two important findings.54 For a video tape service provider to 
violate § 2710(b) of the VPPA, the user must be a “consumer” under the 
Act and the video tape service provider must disclose “personally 
identifiable information.”55 The district court first considered whether the
VPPA protected Ellis as a “consumer” of CN.56 To do so, the district 
court applied a broader definition of the word subscriber and stated that 
a user can become a “subscriber” under the Act without logging into an 
app or paying for it.57 Under this line of reasoning, by downloading the 
app onto his smartphone, Ellis’s actions amounted to more than just 
simply visiting CN’s website, making him a protected “subscriber” under 
the VPPA.58
The second issue decided by the district court was whether Bango 
actually received personally identifiable information about Ellis.59
Personally identifiable information is defined under the VPPA as 
“information which identifies a person as having requested or obtained 
specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider.”60
                                                                                                                     
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1253–54. 
49. Id. at 1254.
50. Id. (“[A] 64–bit number (hex string) that is randomly generated when a user sets up his 
device and should remain constant for the lifetime of the user’s device.”). 
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (noting that Bango can link an Android ID to a particular person by gathering 
information from other sources). 
54. See id.
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (2012) (“A video tape service provider who knowingly 
discloses, to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such 
provider shall be liable to the aggrieved person for the relief provided in subsection (d).”). 
56. Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1254.
57. Id. 
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1254–55.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3). 
9
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The court found that the disclosure of Ellis’s video viewing records and 
Android ID was not “personally identifiable information” as defined by 
the Act because it failed to link Ellis himself to the video materials.61
Because Bango had to take its own additional steps to identify Ellis, CN 
did not violate the VPPA and Ellis could not receive protection under it.62
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal 
de novo.63 The court began its analysis by addressing the definition of 
“subscriber” under the VPPA.64 Prior to Ellis’ case, only a few district 
courts had defined the term.65 For example, in Yershov v. Gannett 
Satellite Information Network, Inc.,66 the United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts held that the simple act of downloading an 
app did not make a user a subscriber, especially when the user did not 
have to make a payment or register with the provider.67 However, 
Yershov directly conflicted with the Northern District of Georgia’s 
decision in Locklear v. Dow Jones & Co.,68 which held that a user was a 
subscriber after visiting its website and watching its video content.69
Given these conflicting decisions, the Eleventh Circuit felt compelled to
perform its own statutory interpretation of the term “subscriber.”70
The Eleventh Circuit referenced several dictionaries to look at the 
ordinary meaning of “subscriber.”71 The fourth edition of Webster’s New 
World College Dictionary defined the term as a person who is “registered 
to pay for and receive a periodical, service, theater tickets, etc. for a 
specified period of time.”72 Similarly, the fifth edition of the Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary defined the term as a “contributor to a project, 
fund, etc.; a person subscribing to a periodical, for share issue, etc.”73
Additionally, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary stated that a 
“subscriber” is “one that favors, aids, or supports (as by money 
contribution, moral influence, [or] personal membership).”74 The court 
                                                                                                                     
61. Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1254–55.
62. Id. at 1255.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id., for a discussion comparing and contrasting several district court cases that 
provided conflicting definitions of the term “subscriber.” 
66. 104 F. Supp. 3d 135 (D. Mass. 2015), rev’d, 820 F.3d 482 (1st. Cir. 2016).
67. Id. at 149.
68. 101 F. Supp. 3d 1312 (N.D. Ga. 2015), abrogated by Ellis, 803 F.3d 1251.
69. Id. at 1316.
70. See Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1255.
71. Id. at 1255–56.
72. Id. at 1255 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1427 (4th ed. 
2000)).
73. Id. at 1255–56 (quoting 2 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3089 (5th ed. 2002)).
74. Id. at 1256 (alteration in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 2278 (3d ed. 1981)).
10
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noted that not all of these definitions referenced some sort of payment to 
be made, and thus agreed with the Northern District of Georgia that
payment is an unnecessary factor.75 Therefore, a user can become a 
“subscriber” without making a payment to the video tape service
provider.76
While payment was determined to be unnecessary, a commonality 
among the dictionary definitions is that there must be “some type of 
commitment, relationship, or association (financial or otherwise) 
between a person and an entity.”77 The Eleventh Circuit referenced
Austin–Spearman v. AMC Network Entertainment LLC,78 which 
suggested that there must be affirmative action by the user that creates a 
type of ongoing relationship where the user supplies the provider with 
sufficient personal information.79 In Ellis, the court also relied on the 
District of Massachusetts’ holding in Yershov80 to support the proposition 
that downloading an app, without providing any personal information, 
does not make a user a subscriber.81 If Congress had intended for a 
broader definition of “consumer,” it could have included the term “user” 
or “viewer,” but, importantly, it did not.82
Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit scrutinized the lower court’s reliance on 
In re Hulu Privacy Litigation.83 The court distinguished Hulu from the 
instant case because the plaintiffs in Hulu were registered users, signed 
up for an account, received a Hulu ID, and streamed videos using Hulu’s 
services.84 Therefore, Hulu did not support the proposition that a user 
does not have to register or log in to be considered a “subscriber.”85 In 
Ellis’ case, and unlike the plaintiffs in Hulu, Ellis did not create an 
account with CN, did not provide CN with any personal information, did 
not become a registered user, did not make any payments, did not 
establish a profile, and did not receive a Cartoon Network ID.86 The sole 
act of downloading the app therefore did not create an ongoing 
                                                                                                                     
75. Id. (“The term ‘subscriber’ is not preceded by the word ‘paid’ in § 2710(a)(1) of the 
VPPA, and there are numerous periodicals, newsletters, blogs, videos, and other services that a 
user can sign up for . . . and receive for free. Payment, therefore, is only one factor a court should 
consider when determining whether an individual is a ‘subscriber’ under the VPPA.”) (citation 
omitted).
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. 98 F. Supp. 3d 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
79. Id. at 669.
80. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
81. Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1256.
82. Id. at 1256–57.
83. No. C 11–03764 LB, 2012 WL 3282960 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012). 
84. Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1257.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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commitment or relationship between Ellis and CN that amounted to the 
level of becoming a “subscriber” under the VPPA.87 Further, Ellis was 
also able to delete the CN app without any consequences.88
In summation, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal of Ellis’s complaint, but did not agree with its definition of 
“subscriber.”89 Downloading a free app in order to watch free content 
does not make a user a “subscriber” under the VPPA.90 Because the
Eleventh Circuit held that Ellis was not a “subscriber” and therefore not 
protected under the VPPA, it did not address the next issue regarding 
personally identifiable information.91
2. Perry v. CNN
After its decision in Ellis in 2015, the Eleventh Circuit was confronted 
once again with the same issues two years later. In Perry v. Cable News 
Network, Inc.,92 Ryan Perry filed a proposed class action against Cable 
News Network, also known as CNN, under the VPPA.93 Perry alleged 
that CNN unlawfully disclosed his personally identifiable information to 
a third party.94 Perry sought to amend his complaint, but the district court 
granted CNN’s motion to dismiss his case entirely, stating that any 
additional amendments would be futile.95 The district court held that 
Perry failed to state a claim under the VPPA because he was not a 
“consumer” under the Act and that the information alleged was not 
“personally identifiable.”96
CNN produces news programming for television, but also offers a 
mobile app where users can receive news alerts and watch videos of live 
events.97 Users are able to download the app through the Apple iTunes 
Store, and the app does not ask for consent to disclose personal data to 
third parties before downloading.98 Perry claimed that CNN tracked his 
viewing activity and then sent his records to Bango without his 
knowledge or consent.99 Through the app, CNN does send to Bango a 
                                                                                                                     
87. Id.
88. Id. (“The downloading of an app, we think, is the equivalent of adding a particular 
website to one’s Internet browser as a favorite, allowing quicker access to the website’s content.”). 
89. Id. at 1257–58.
90. Id. at 1258.
91. Id. at 1252.
92. 854 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2017). 
93. Id. at 1339.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1338.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1339.
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user’s MAC address, which is “a unique string of numbers associated 
with a particular user’s specific mobile device.”100 Bango, a data analytics 
company,101 is able to learn about a user’s online behavior by linking their
MAC address to their other internet activity.102 More importantly, Bango 
is able to create a personal profile of the individual user and collect their
name, email address, location, phone number, and payment 
information.103
On de novo review, the Eleventh Circuit first addressed the issue of 
standing.104 CNN claimed that Perry failed to allege a legally cognizable 
injury, but the court rejected this argument.105 In certain cases, a plaintiff 
does not need to allege additional harm if a statute provides a procedural 
right and that right has been violated.106 The purpose of the VPPA is to 
provide an actionable right to consumers who have had their personally 
identifiable information disclosed to third parties without their consent.107
Thus, a violation of the VPPA is a concrete harm.108
On appeal, Perry conceded that while he failed to state a claim under 
the VPPA, he should have been able to amend his complaint.109 Perry 
argued that in addition to downloading the app onto his iPhone, he also 
subscribed to CNN through his cable package, and that the disclosure of 
his MAC address and video history constituted personally identifiable 
information under the VPPA.110 In disagreement, the Eleventh Circuit 
relied on its previous decision in Ellis, stating that there must be an 
ongoing commitment or relationship between the user and provider in 
order to become a “subscriber.”111 The court analogized the instant case 
to Ellis, in which both plaintiffs downloaded a free app without signing 
up for an account, making any payments, or becoming a registered 
user.112 Under the Eleventh Circuit’s more narrow view of the term 
“subscriber,” the plaintiffs’ actions in both cases failed to create or 
                                                                                                                     
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
102. Perry, 854 F.3d at 1339.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1339–40 (“Perry has established his standing to file this action because his alleged 
injury is sufficiently concrete.”).
106. Id. at 1340 (citing Spokeo Inc., v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)). 
107. See id.
108. Id. at 1340–41 (noting that the VPPA was created to protect personal privacy and that 
Supreme Court precedent has recognized that individuals have an interest in protecting their 
personal information from being disclosed). 
109. Id. at 1341.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1342.
112. Id.
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establish a relationship or commitment with the providers.113
Additionally, the court rejected Perry’s argument that he subscribed to 
CNN’s television channel through his cable package.114
The Eleventh Circuit in Perry cited the First Circuit’s decision in 
Yershov, which distinguished Ellis from the case at bar.115 In Yershov, the 
plaintiff provided his mobile device identification number to use the app, 
which established a relationship.116 In contrast, Perry did not provide any 
personal information when he downloaded CNN’s app.117 The Eleventh 
Circuit held that, as a result, Perry was not a “subscriber” under the 
VPPA.118 By resolving the first prong of the VPPA statute, the court did 
not need to address whether the information was personally 
identifiable.119
B. United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
1. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network Inc.
Alexander Yershov brought a putative class-action lawsuit alleging 
that Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. (Gannett) violated the 
VPPA by disclosing his personal information to a third party.120 The 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that 
while Gannett disclosed personally identifiable information to a third 
party, the VPPA did not protect Yershov  because he was neither a
“consumer” nor “subscriber.”121 The First Circuit reversed the district 
court’s dismissal of the complaint, holding that Yershov was a 
“consumer” and that Gannett disclosed his personally identifiable 
information to a third party, thus violating the VPPA.122
Gannett, an international media company, produces news and 
entertainment programming in both printed and digital forms.123 The 
newspaper USA Today is offered in digital form through Gannett’s 
mobile app, known as the “USA Today Mobile App.”124 To download 
                                                                                                                     
113. Id.
114. Id. (“Perry’s proposed amendment, however, shows a commitment to only his cable 
television provider, rather than to CNN.”). 
115. Id. at 1343–44.
116. Id. at 1343.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1344. 
119. Id.
120. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 484 (1st Cir. 2016).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (“The App allows users to access news and entertainment media content, including 
videos, on their mobile devices.”). 
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the app onto a mobile phone, users must visit the Google Play Store, 
which is an online media platform run by Google.125 After downloading 
the app, users do not receive any notification asking for their consent, but 
are asked for permission to receive notifications.126 Despite not asking 
for consent, Gannett still discloses to Adobe Systems Incorporated: “(1) 
the title of the video viewed, (2) the GPS coordinates of the device at the 
time the video was viewed, and (3) certain identifiers associated with the 
user’s device, such as its unique Android ID.”127 Adobe Systems 
Incorporated is able to compile the information sent by Gannett to create 
a profile that contains a user’s personal information, their online activity, 
and device identifiers.128
On de novo review, the First Circuit addressed two issues: the 
meaning of “subscriber” and the meaning of “personally identifiable 
information” under the VPPA.129 Beginning with personally identifiable 
information,130 the court observed that the actual statutory term is 
awkward and unclear.131 The abstract language used to define the term 
can be seen to encompass information that does not explicitly name an 
individual.132 Furthermore, the definition contains the word “includes,” 
which signals that the “definition falls short of capturing the whole
meaning.”133 Therefore, if the information disclosed is reasonably and 
foreseeably likely to link an individual to their video history, it constitutes
“personally identifiable information” under the Act.134 In Yershov, it was 
reasonably likely that Adobe had the technology to link Yershov’s GPS 
address and identifiable device information to his video history.135
                                                                                                                     
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. (noting that Adobe Systems Incorporated is a third-party data analytics company 
that collects information about a user’s online activity). 
128. Id. at 484–85 (“The information contained in these profiles may include, for example, 
the user’s name and address, age and income, ‘household structure,’ and online navigation and 
transaction history. These digital dossiers provide Adobe and its clients with ‘an intimate look at 
the different types of materials consumed by the individual’ that ‘may reveal, or help create 
inferences about,’ a user’s traits and preferences.”). 
129. Id. at 485 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1), (3) (2012)).
130. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3) (“[T]he term ‘personally identifiable information’ includes 
information which identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or 
services from a video tape service provider.”). 
131. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 486.
132. Cf. id. (“The definition of that term (‘identifies a person as having [obtained a video]’)
adds little clarity beyond training our focus on the question whether the information identifies the 
person who obtained the video.” (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3))). 
133. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3)) (discussing how the official Senate Report stated 
that the goal was to establish a non-exclusive definition). 
134. See id.
135. Id. 
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For the definition of “subscriber,” the court assumed that the plain and 
ordinary meaning applied because Congress left the term undefined.136
The court analogized the facts at bar to the definition provided by The 
American Heritage Dictionary.137 The dictionary defined “subscribe” as 
“[t]o receive or be allowed to access electronic texts or services by 
subscription,” and defined “subscription” as “[a]n agreement to receive 
or be given access to electronic texts or services.”138 In Yershov, Gannett 
offered its mobile app to Yershov, who in turn accepted it by 
downloading the app in order to view Gannett’s electronic services.139
This indicated that Yershov intended to visit the app multiple times and 
not just once.140
The next issue the court faced was whether the statutory term includes 
payment as a necessary element of becoming a subscriber.141 When 
looking at the language of the VPPA, the definition of “consumer” also 
includes a “renter” or a “purchaser.”142 Both of these terms require a 
consumer to provide some type of monetary payment, leading the court 
to conclude that if Congress only intended to protect paying consumers, 
it would not have added an unnecessary third category of 
“subscribers.”143 In addition, it was not uncommon for a consumer to 
acquire videos from a supplier in 1988 with money back or without 
having to pay a fee; therefore, there is no reason to assume that Congress
would have wanted to give consumers less protection with the electronic 
technology used today.144
Ultimately, the First Circuit did not want to adopt a narrow definition 
of “subscriber,” even after considering the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in 
Ellis.145 Ellis noted that the term “subscriber” does not require monetary 
payment, but the simple act of downloading an app onto a mobile phone, 
without providing any additional personal information, did not establish 
the necessary relationship to become a subscriber based on the facts of 
                                                                                                                     
136. Id. at 487.
137. Id.
138. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1726 (4th 
ed. 2000)).
139. Id. (“[M]uch like how a newspaper subscriber in 1988 could, if he wished, retrieve a 
copy of the paper in a box at the end of his driveway without having to go look for it at a store.”).  
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (2012); see Yershov, 820 F.3d at 487.
143. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 487.
144. Id. at 488 (“Congress left untouched the definition of ‘consumer’ in the statute, which 
we believe supports an inference that Congress understood its originally-provided definition to 
provide at least as much protection in the digital age as it provided in 1988.”). 
145. Id. 
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that case.146 However, the First Circuit in Yershov disagreed.147 Even 
though Yershov, unlike Ellis, provided some personal information,148
Yershov established a relationship with Gannett by installing the app onto 
his mobile phone, which allowed him to gain access to the electronic 
newspaper.149 The court noted that this type of relationship is different 
from when a user just views videos through a web browser.150 Therefore, 
the Court found that Yershov’s act of downloading the app onto his phone 
and providing some personal information made him a protected 
“consumer” and “subscriber” under the VPPA.151
C. Summary of the Circuit Split
The recent cases of Ellis, Perry, and Yershov involved users who 
downloaded an app onto their mobile phones to watch videos, unaware 
that their personal information was being disclosed to unidentified third 
parties without their consent.152 All three plaintiffs brought their cases 
under the VPPA alleging that they were protected “consumers,” but each 
case resulted in a different outcome due to conflicting circuit court 
opinions.153 Currently, the Eleventh Circuit holds that a user must have 
an ongoing commitment or relationship with the video tape service 
provider to become a protected “subscriber,” which requires more action 
than just downloading an app onto a mobile phone.154 In contrast, the First 
Circuit currently holds that a user who downloads an app onto their
mobile phone and provides the app with their personal information is a 
protected “subscriber.”155 More importantly, the First Circuit reasoned in 
the dicta of Yershov that a broader definition of “subscriber” should be 
adopted under the VPPA to protect users who download an app onto their 
mobile phone without providing any additional personal information or 
paying some sort of fee.156
                                                                                                                     
146. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
147. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 488.
148. Id. at 489 (noting that Yershov provided his Android ID and mobile device’s GPS 
location). 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. See discussion supra Sections II.A, II.B. 
153. See discussion supra Sections II.A, II.B.
154. See Perry v. Cable News Network, Inc., 854 F.3d 1336, 1343 & n.6 (11th Cir. 2017); 
Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir. 2015).  
155. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 489.
156. Id. at 488–89 (“Our unwillingness to adopt one of the narrower meanings of ‘subscriber’ 
rests as well on our recognition that Congress itself, in 2012, considered the impact of the VPPA 
on the electronic distribution of videos and chose only to make consent easier to obtain, rather 
than limiting the reach of the Act in the absence of consent.”).
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III. FIRST PRONG: A NEW DEFINITION
A. Policy and Privacy Concerns
To resolve the circuit split and provide protection to the millions of 
users that download apps onto their mobile phones to watch videos, there 
must be a broad, uniform definition of the term “subscriber” under the 
VPPA. As noted above, Congress has only amended the language of the 
VPPA once since its original enactment in 1988.157 Over the past thirty 
years, there have been astounding advances in technology that have 
redesigned how individuals are connected to the internet, to social media, 
and to numerous other technological platforms through their mobile 
phones.158 More specifically, as a nascent commercial environment in the 
United States, mobile commerce has raised significant policy and privacy 
issues.159
The increased use of mobile phones and apps allows users to stay 
connected to the news, stream videos, and purchase goods or services—
just to name a few uses.160 However, it also allows video tape service 
providers and other companies to take advantage of marketing 
opportunities and gain access to users’ personal information without their 
consent or knowledge.161 According to legal scholar Nancy J. King, 
consumers face two key privacy concerns due to the increased use of 
mobile phones and advertising practices: “[(]1) the collection, use, and 
disclosure of consumers’ personally identifying information that 
accompanies mobile advertising; and [(]2) the generation of unsolicited 
mobile advertising.”162 Mobiles phones are providing companies with 
extensive marketing opportunities,163 raising a need for increased 
consumer privacy protections that allow for the continued use and 
                                                                                                                     
157. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
158. Nancy J. King, Direct Marketing, Mobile Phones, and Consumer Privacy: Ensuring 
Adequate Disclosure and Consent Mechanisms for Emerging Mobile Advertising Practices, 60 
FED. COMM. L.J. 229, 231–32 & n.2 (2008). 
159. Id. at 231–32 (discussing how an increase of consumers who have mobile phones has 
led to a new commercial environment due to the availability of new communications and 
advertising opportunities that are available through mobile phones). 
160. See id. at 231–32 & n.2.
161. See id. at 232 (noting that companies collect, use, and disseminate consumers’ 
personally identifiable information for advertising purposes); see also Nicole A. Ozer, Putting 
Online Privacy Above the Fold: Building a Social Movement and Creating Corporate Change,
36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 221 (2012) (“The growth in consumer concern regarding 
online privacy has become particularly marked in select sectors, including targeted advertising, 
social networking, and mobile services.”). 
162. King, supra note 158, at 232. 
163. Id. at 233. 
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technological advances of mobile phones without subjecting users to 
invasions of privacy. 
The need for increased consumer protection under the VPPA will 
continue to escalate as this is a new and developing issue faced by the 
courts, as well as by everyday consumers.164 Even though the VPPA was 
enacted in 1988, advances in technology and the increased use of mobile 
phones have created relationships between users and video tape service 
providers that should be protected under the VPPA. The future 
developments of mobile technology, apps, and video streaming will only 
blur the lines between who becomes a “consumer” or “subscriber” under 
the Act if the statutory language remains unchanged. Therefore, the first 
step in resolving this issue requires that the VPPA be amended to include 
a clear and unambiguous definition of “subscriber.” 
B. The Definition of Subscriber
Currently, there is no definition for the term “subscriber” under the 
VPPA. The most critical issue faced by the First and Eleventh Circuits 
was analyzing and interpreting the language of the VPPA to formulate a 
definition that would be applicable to Perry, Ellis, and Yershov.165 Instead 
of solely relying on the statutory language provided by the VPPA, the 
circuit courts had to consult other sources and dictionaries, resort to 
analogical reasoning, and attempt to assume Congress’s original intent 
when it enacted the VPPA.166 Thus, the most direct way to resolve this 
                                                                                                                     
164. See Ozer, supra note 161, at 220–21 (“Surveys performed over the past decade have 
consistently shown that a large percentage of the American public is concerned about their online 
privacy. In a 2000 study, 94 percent of respondents said that having their security and privacy 
protected when they were online was ‘very important.’ A 2004 Carnegie Mellon/Berkman Fund 
study found that more than 87 percent of respondents felt that they did not have enough privacy 
in today’s society. By 2005, 52 percent of Americans believed that their right to privacy was 
‘under serious threat.’ In recent years, consumer concern has further escalated, both in the United 
States and around the world.” (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Andrew Clement & Christie 
Hurrell, Information/Communications Rights as a New Environmentalism? Core Environmental 
Concepts for Linking Rights-Oriented Computerization Movements, in COMPUTERIZATION 
MOVEMENTS AND TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION: FROM MAINFRAMES TO UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 337,
352 (Margaret S. Elliott & Kenneth L. Kraemer eds., 2008); and then quoting Joel Roberts, Poll: 
Privacy Rights Under Attack, CBS NEWS (Sept. 30, 2005, 2:39 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/poll-privacy-rights-under-attack/ [https://perma.cc/ZRB7-G982])). 
165. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
166. See Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(“Because it contains no definition of the term ‘subscriber,’ nor any clear indication that Congress 
had a specific definition in mind, we assume that the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ of the world 
applies.” (quoting Stornawaye Fin. Corp. v. Hill (In re Hill), 562 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 2009)));
Ellis v. Cartoon Network Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The VPPA does not define 
the term ‘subscriber,’ and we, as a circuit, have yet to address what the term means. The few 
district courts that have weighed in on the issue appear to be divided.”). 
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interpretive issue is to amend the VPPA to include an unambiguous 
definition of “subscriber.”
Given the numerous policy and privacy issues that have accompanied 
the expansive increase of mobile technology since the VPPA’s enactment 
in 1988, the definition of “subscriber” needs to be broad to protect users 
who download an app without providing any other personal 
information.167 The First and Eleventh Circuits both agree that monetary 
payment is not required to become a “subscriber” under the VPPA.168
Instead, determining the most applicable definition focuses on the nature 
of the relationship formed between the user and the video tape service 
provider. This determination includes assessing how the user downloaded 
the app, the user’s accessibility to the videos on the app, and whether the 
user was required to provide additional personal information. 
Broadening the definition will allow the statute to adapt to an 
expanding area of technology and protect app users; however, the 
definition must not be too broad.169 The foundation to formulating a 
definition starts with the definitions cited by the First Circuit in 
Yershov.170 The Fourth Edition of the American Heritage Dictionary
defines “subscribe” as “[t]o receive or be allowed to access electronic 
texts or services by subscription” and defines “subscription” as “[a]n 
agreement to receive or be given access to electronic texts or services.”171
These definitions cover users who download apps onto their mobile 
phones to watch videos and receive other electronic information.
This Note suggests combining both definitions of the terms listed 
above so that the VPPA defines “subscriber” as “an individual who 
agrees to be allowed to access electronic texts or services through an 
agreement and continues to access the electronic texts or services.” While 
this Note’s definition might seem much broader than the Eleventh 
Circuit’s approach of requiring an ongoing commitment or 
                                                                                                                     
167. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 488 (“Our unwillingness to adopt one of the narrower 
meanings of ‘subscriber’ rests as well on our recognition that Congress itself, in 2012, considered 
the impact of the VPPA on the electronic distribution of videos and chose only to make consent 
easier to obtain, rather than limiting the reach of the Act in the absence of consent.”). 
168. See id. (“[W]e therefore decline to interpret the statute as incorporating monetary 
payment as a necessary element.”); Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1256 (“We agree with the district court that 
payment is not a necessary element of subscription.”). 
169. See Suzanne L. Riopel, Comment, The Price of Free Mobile Apps Under the Video 
Privacy Protection Act, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 115, 126–27 (2016) (noting that defining subscriber 
to include unregistered users of mobile apps would effectively make the term “consumer” into the 
term “any person” in the statute).  
170. See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying discussion. 
171. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 487 (alterations in original) (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY 1726 (4th ed. 2000)).
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relationship,172 it is nonetheless similar. It still requires an ongoing 
relationship between the user and app, as well as an agreement. However, 
this Note’s definition takes into account that by downloading a free app 
onto a mobile phone, a user has agreed to receive electronic services and 
information provided by the app while the app remains installed on the 
mobile phone. This in itself establishes an ongoing relationship. On both 
ends, there is an agreement by the user and the video tape service 
provider, as noted by the First Circuit.173 The agreement begins to form 
when video tape service providers create apps that are available to users. 
In return, users who choose to download the apps and install them onto 
their mobile phones have agreed to receive those electronic texts, videos, 
and other services provided by the apps. 
Users who download apps onto mobile phones should become 
protected subscribers under the Act because they have established a 
relationship that differs from the act of merely using an internet web 
browser. Downloading an app onto a mobile phone is not comparable to 
the act of favoriting a website—an analogy used by the Eleventh Circuit 
in Ellis.174 Users may favorite a website to save content that they wish to 
return to or to have quicker access to that website. On the other hand, 
mobile apps that are particularly designed for streaming videos and 
providing news, such as Cartoon Network and CNN’s apps, are 
physically installed onto a user’s mobile phone and have the ability to 
send push notifications and other alerts to the user. This creates an 
ongoing relationship between the user and the app that can be upgraded, 
modified, updated, and/or terminated. Furthermore, users have to 
physically click and choose to download the app from a platform onto 
their mobile phones before they can begin to view its content or watch its 
videos, unlike the ability to browse the internet and favorite websites 
without having to download any additional software or app. 
In summation, this Note’s definition of “subscriber” under the VPPA 
will provide more protection to users who do not purchase or rent videos, 
but still agree to form a relationship with video tape service providers in 
order to view those providers’ content on their mobile phones. The 
definition is not too broad because it still requires an agreement between 
the user and provider, as well as the actual process of downloading the 
app onto a mobile phone. Users of video tape service providers who 
                                                                                                                     
172. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
173. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 487 (“Gannett offered and Yershov accepted Gannett’s 
proprietary mobile device application as a tool for directly receiving access to Gannett’s electronic 
text and videos without going through other distribution channels, much like how a newspaper 
subscriber in 1988 could, if he wished, retrieve a copy of the paper in a box at the end of his 
driveway without having to go look for it at a store.”). 
174. See Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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create apps that are specifically designed to provide videos should be a 
class of protected “consumers” under the VPPA. The process of a 
provider creating an app to provide services to a user and that user, in 
return, agreeing to download the app establishes the necessary 
relationship and agreement to become a protected “subscriber.”175
Allowing video tape service providers to disclose secretly the personal 
information of users who downloaded their apps should not be allowed 
to conduct such an invasion of privacy without first obtaining consent. 
Implementing this Note’s definition will provide additional protection to 
each user that becomes a “subscriber” by agreeing to download an app 
and receive the app’s services.  
C. Summary of First Solution 
The first step to resolving the circuit split requires clarifying the 
ambiguous language of the VPPA through an amendment. The original 
language of the VPPA, from its enactment in 1988, has failed to adapt to 
the technological advances that allow users to download free apps to 
watch videos on their mobile phones. The traditional method of renting 
videos from brick and mortar stores, like Blockbuster, has become 
outdated by the recent influx of mobile phone technology.176 Users who 
download apps onto their mobile phone to watch videos should become 
a class of protected “consumers” under the VPPA. 
Congress must amend the VPPA to include a definition of subscriber 
to create an unambiguous class of “consumers” that will receive 
protection.177 This Note suggests that the VPPA should define 
“subscriber” as “an individual who agrees to be allowed to access 
electronic texts or services through an agreement and continues to access 
the electronic texts or services.” The issue that follows after an individual 
comes within the protection of the VPPA is discerning whether the 
information disclosed was personally identifiable information. While the 
determination of what constitutes personally identifiable information is 
critical, the issue with the circuit split focuses on the undefined term 
“subscriber.” If a plaintiff cannot become a “consumer” or “subscriber,” 
                                                                                                                     
175. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
176. See Jason Nark, Renting DVDs in the Age of Netflix: Glenview-Based Family Video 
Carves out Strategy in Rural America, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 19, 2019, 8:50 AM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-family-video-dvd-rentals-20190219-story.html
[https://perma.cc/C9F4-88RE] (“When the digital age . . . came for the brick-and-mortar movie 
rental business, the decline was rapid. Blockbuster Video, the rental giant with nearly 9,000 
locations, declared bankruptcy in 2010.”).
177. See supra Section III.B. 
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courts will not consider the issue of personally identifiable 
information.178
IV. SECOND PRONG: A UNIFORM TEST
A. The Balancing Test
Amending the VPPA to include a broader definition of “subscriber” 
will resolve the current circuit split, but a single definition will not remain 
as determinative in future cases. Advances in technology will continue to 
challenge the scope of the VPPA’s language. More specifically, the 
increasing use of mobile phones will create new ways for users to become 
protected “consumers” under the Act. A balancing test that focuses on 
how the user established a relationship with the app, as well as how often 
the user interacted with the app, will provide the necessary flexible 
approach for courts to use when determining whether a user should be 
protected under the VPPA. 
Each individual case brought under the VPPA is very fact-specific. 
Therefore, the balancing test, consisting of several different factors, will 
allow courts to rely on two different approaches. The first approach 
consists of solely looking at the language of the VPPA and determining 
whether the plaintiff clearly falls into one of the defined categories: a 
“purchaser,” “subscriber,” or “renter.” If the case is clear, a court will not 
need to apply the balancing test. However, if the facts create a situation 
where it is unclear what category the plaintiff is in, the second approach 
mandates courts to apply the test. In doing so, courts will weigh the 
different factors present in the case to determine if the plaintiff 
established the necessary relationship to become a protected “consumer.” 
The test will specifically apply to the use of mobile phones and apps 
under the VPPA. 
If 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) is not applicable when determining 
whether a user is a protected “consumer” under the Video 
Privacy Protection Act, a court must consider and weigh the 
following factors:
(1) whether the user provided information to the video tape 
service provider prior to, during, or after downloading the 
app;
(2) the type of information provided by the user if applicable;
                                                                                                                     
178. See Perry v. Cable News Network, Inc., 854 F.3d 1336, 1344 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Having 
concluded that that the district court did not err in concluding that Perry is not a 
‘subscriber’ . . . we need not address the second prong for liability under the VPPA, whether CNN 
provided Perry’s ‘personally identifiable information’ to a third party.”). 
23
Rizzolo: From Blockbuster to Big Brother: How an Increase in Mobile Phone
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
1092 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
(3) how often the user accessed the app;
(4) whether the user removed or deleted the app from their
mobile phone; and/or
(5) whether the user agreed to receive notifications from the 
app. 
This balancing test mirrors the requirements for protection under 
§ 2710(a)(1),179 but also extends protection to users that establish an 
ongoing commitment or relationship with an app through other means not 
explicitly covered by the statute. The variance among each factor allows
the courts to broaden the scope of the VPPA, which is necessary to protect 
a user’s privacy rights. Under this Note’s newly proposed statutory 
definition of “subscriber,”180 there are still many instances when a user’s 
conduct may not fit within the definition. For example, a user may not 
have downloaded the app onto their phone, or the phone already came 
with pre-installed apps. This type of situation is where the balancing test
well demonstrates its flexibility. Applying each factor will help courts 
discern whether there was the establishment or termination of an ongoing 
commitment or relationship between the user and app.
The first two factors a court should consider is whether the user 
provided any information to the app and, if so, the type of information 
provided. In Yershov, the court noted that in addition to installing the app 
onto his mobile phone, the plaintiff also provided personal information, 
including his Android ID and GPS location, which created a more 
distinctive relationship with the app.181 Applying the rationale in Yershov,
it can be inferred that the user’s act of providing personal information to 
an app strengthens their relationship with the video tape service provider 
and should, therefore, be a determinative factor. For example, as 
mentioned above, mobile phones may have apps that are already pre-
installed onto the phone before being purchased. Under this scenario, a 
user would not satisfy this Article’s new definition of “subscriber” 
because they did not agree to download the app. However, a court will 
have the ability to conclude, under the balancing test, that the user became 
a protected subscriber by providing personal information to the app, 
which created an ongoing commitment or relationship with that app.
The remaining three factors of the test also directly pertain to whether 
the user has established an ongoing commitment or relationship with the 
app. A court may analyze a user’s frequency of use to determine whether 
a relationship existed and, if so, for how long. If a user downloads an app, 
                                                                                                                     
179. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (2012) (defining who becomes a “consumer” under the 
VPPA). 
180. See supra Section III.B. 
181. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. 820 F.3d 482, 489 (1st Cir. 2016).
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but never accesses the app again, there is no ongoing relationship. 
However, revisiting the pre-installed app example, a user can rise to this 
Note’s definition of what constitutes a “subscriber” by consistently 
accessing an app, just as if they had subscribed to it. The same rationale 
applies to a user who has deleted an app, thereby terminating any ongoing 
relationship, or to a user who agrees to receive notifications, thereby 
creating a relationship.
Ultimately, the balancing test guides courts to weigh and consider 
several factors that relate to the establishment of an ongoing relationship 
between a user and an app that should receive protection under the VPPA. 
While it is not a bright-line rule, courts will have the necessary discretion 
to consider the strength of each of the factors depending on the individual 
facts of a case. Courts will also have the option to look only to the 
language of the VPPA if a plaintiff falls squarely into one of the defined 
categories. This will eliminate future ambiguities under the VPPA by 
expanding the scope of protection afforded under § 2710(a)(1). 
B. Implications of the Test
Implementing the balancing test is the most effective way to resolve 
the ambiguities created by the language of the VPPA.182 The flexibility 
of the test will continue to protect users notwithstanding future 
technological advances.183 Applying a strict test or bright-line rule will 
only constrain the scope of protection afforded by the VPPA by allowing 
advances in mobile phone technology to create new ways for users to 
download apps that do not come under the purview of the statute. 
Therefore, the balancing test gives judges the discretion to weigh the 
importance of the most determinative factors without creating only one 
scenario in which a user can become a protected “consumer” under the 
VPPA. As a result, the test will provide a framework courts can use to 
assess future cases brought under the VPPA regarding the use of mobile 
phones.
CONCLUSION
Recently, the language of the VPPA has failed to encompass an 
emerging area of technology that will continue to rapidly expand and 
create more ambiguities. Outdated and undefined terminology, stemming 
from the VPPA’s original enactment in 1988, has opened the door to 
                                                                                                                     
182. See Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585, 651 (1988) (“[T]he 
balancing test has become an important part of American legal process. Courts use it to find facts, 
to create rules, and to determine results, as well as to . . . construe statutes, and to resolve common 
law disputes.”). 
183. See id. at 655 (“In areas of law so novel or complex that principled sets of rules are 
especially difficult to fashion, a court might introduce the test in order to encourage 
experimentation on a case-by-case basis.”). 
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statutory interpretation, resulting in numerous conflicting opinions 
among the circuits. If the VPPA remains unchanged, courts and 
individuals will remain in a state of uncertainty regarding the scope of 
protection that the statute affords.
To resolve the circuit split, protect an individual’s right to privacy, 
and provide a solution that will continue to grow with advances in mobile 
phone technology, Congress must amend the VPPA to include a broader
definition of “subscriber.” The second and more critical step is to
implement the balancing test. This Note’s two-pronged approach will 
allow courts to expand the scope of the VPPA in a more structured and 
focused manner. Currently, a bright-line rule will not be beneficial when 
applied to this area of law and technology, which has the ability to expand 
without limitations. While in the future a more determinative rule may be 
applicable, the current and immediate solution calls for a more flexible 
and broad approach.
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